Scent of Time

 

 

 

四月中旬过后，天天的雨过天晴白云飘。如此的滋润下，叶咋不舒展？花咋不欢笑？挑个阳光亮得晃眼的日子，出门去凑凑大自然的热闹，说得雅叫‘踏青’。从家往Bute Park走一遭，浮光掠影地将春浓缩在这里。记得最喜站在花树下，闻着花的香味，低头看着脚下遍地的花瓣和班驳的影子，傻笑，出神。站久了，好象心里都发出芽开出花来。或者这就是万物复苏的神奇力量吧。

 

附记：

1。周二在千年音乐厅看了台湾云门舞社的‘月亮水’，行云流水的动作很美，构思也很巧，美中不足是贯穿始终的平缓的大提琴曲调反复重复，缺乏一点变化与张力。

 

2。周六打高球，状态出奇的好，简直是个质的飞跃，兴奋坏了。应该留念一下的，带了相机忘记照了。

 

3。周日去同办公室的anna家做客，中间有两件事很出乎意料：

 

一是她家的房子，完全是林中别墅的style，氛围与情调好得完全可以上电视。（我跟jimmy经常喜欢看一些房产节目，如Move to countryside或着Property Ladder，后面一个尤其有趣，有机会单开一节讲讲）后悔没带相机。

 

另一个是吃完晚饭喝茶的时候，她妈妈居然拿出男女各一套的中国清代家居服来给我们看，说是从她爸爸也就是anna的外公的遗物里找到的。颜色都是很素雅的藏青色。男的那套花纹里有龙，女的那套构成花纹的图案主题尤其别致，是一个四合院的入口轴测与门前的一棵树，很有韵味。anna妈妈想看看中国女孩穿上的效果，请我试试，正中我的下怀。上身真的很漂亮，大方，贵气，心里暗叹现在滥大街的唐装和旗袍的俗气走样，糟蹋东西，一如那些粗制滥造的仿制古建筑。袖口领口处的收口，扣子的包扣，缎面的绣花等等显出两套衣服出奇精细的做工，让我们猜测这应该是真正的文物。这样一想，那有龙的那件男装岂不是至少也应该是属于贝子亲王什么的吧，谁知道呢。拖文革的福，家家户户都破了四旧了。有可能是文物的想法让我忽然有种很奇怪的感觉。在橱窗里看文物是一回事，感觉自己真的穿上一两百年前的东西又是另一回事了。衣服的主人是谁，又有什么样的故事，这件衣服在什么样的情形下做的，裁缝怎样，又是怎么来这里的，中间过了多少人的手，发生了哪些事。觉得自己因着这件衣服好象也跟那些人那些事也有了某种联系，我也成了这件衣服的故事的一部分。展示完毕后，anna妈妈将其折起放回一个很普通的塑料袋里。看的我心疼死了，真是暴殄天物啊，至少应该挂起来吧。特后悔没带相机。

 

 

 

 

自上上周去了这家意大利餐厅后，JIMMY与我开始致力于去露天跳蚤市场淘宝。

 

 

上周六打算写，结果有事耽搁了，今天补上。

 

对于BBC的‘傲慢与偏见’，我已经见识了三年多，根本不能指望从它那里听到什么中国的好消息。因为就算是条完全不涉及社会政治问题或价值观的新闻，比如‘神舟N号’上天，它在简短的播报后附带的评论都会是什么so far so good，要么就是可能有什么潜在的环境或经济危机之类的‘唱衰’词句。对此，深懂人情世故的导师在我刚到英国的时候就给予了开导。那时侯正好BBC有个时事讨论的直播节目'question time'第一次在中国（上海）录制，正好节目后的第二天我跟导师约好见面，谈正事之前寒暄中就聊到这个事情。导师是个比较sensitive的人，当时还特地问我觉不觉得主持人的问题比较尖锐，我说不觉得啊，这些问题平时都有谈论。他进而说BBC一贯持批评的立场，本国的事务经常都被批得一塌糊涂，更何况是其他国家。有了导师的预防针，有了三年多的经验，BBC对3.14事件的报道及后续播出的记录片，其数不胜数的荒谬之处我认为还基本上无损其标榜的‘自由独立’的专业新闻媒体形象，直到其关于奥运火炬传递的一系列拙劣的报道或者说演出。这个表演是有层次的，有起伏的，有高潮的，绝对精彩，堪称“贱”不忍睹。相比之下，之前被网友曝光的张冠李戴事件都不算什么。真正是，没有最“贱”，只有更“贱”。

 

“贱”事一：

不管是在伦敦，还是巴黎，还是旧金山，BBC的镜头除了追随火炬手，就是寻找藏独分子，在那些明知很有多国人摇旗助威的地段都替那摄像师或剪辑师累，镜头完全不敢乱闪，偶尔往人群两边闪一下不用猜一定是有藏独在那里蹦达。BBC的新闻工作者对拿五星红旗的人群完全试而不见，只采访拿雪山狮子旗的。另外还有两名藏独青年也被请到演播间做访谈。这样明显的选择性的报道方式，BBC出品，也许是我天真，但我确实被骇到。

 

“贱”事二：

火炬在伦敦传的时候，因为在本国，而且布朗首相还要出来接见，所以描述现场的时候语气还甚为收敛，但很狗仔地说：看，我们的布朗首相并没有碰触火炬，他一定是想通过这样来表达立场。到了在巴黎和旧金山传的时候，两个主持人幸灾乐祸，落井下石，惟恐天下不乱，说得唾沫四溅，笑声连连，“贱”相毕露。经常是一个人问：你说这次中国政府是不是被尴尬到了；另一个马上接着答：是啊，绝对是的。这样‘说’新闻，也算开了眼。

 

“贱”事三：

对于西藏这样的涉及地域国际政治问题，BBC一反惯常的多角度探讨真相的态度，除了之前制作好的明显选择性失明的专题片，没有邀请任何的专家或者学者或者资深政客做访谈，就是两个主持人在那里反复地对电视机前的观众洗脑。在一个所谓自由民主的国度，一个公共投资完全独立的媒体，这么严重的明显的洗脑确实又让我幻灭。

 

“贱”事四：

这就说到高潮了。 全世界华人社会的强烈反弹可能让BBC始料不及，而周六伦敦华人针对BBC不公报道的抗议终于把embarrassment放在了他家门口。BBC终于感到有必要彰现一下它的职业道德了。除了采访抗议的学生，还把一个中国专家和另外两个英国嘉宾请到演播室座谈。最要命的是言辞上180度的大转弯，谦卑的话让脸皮稍微薄一点的人都要喊受不了。一会说我们以前很不了解中国及西藏的事情，一会又说确实，之前肤浅的抗议对增进了解是一点用都没有，，，，我的耳朵在发烧，完全听不进去了。你可以将之解释为BBC风格务实，灵活，，但那时那刻，我真的大喊：BBC，你太贱了！

 

附记：

1。周二Sir Peter Hall大驾光临，讲New Geography of Britain。对讲座本身没什么期望，老家伙想讲的，能讲的，都已经包含在那些把他送到sir这个位置上的专著里面。就是想看看他有多老了，听听是不是伦敦腔。答案：老但反应敏捷，不是伦敦腔而且比较刺耳。开场的时候才晓得我导师做chair，因为他跟peter是校友。那近5分钟的介绍，或者说吹捧，真是够他背的，想说，不用吧，来听讲座的谁不知道这些‘事迹’啊。

 

2。周五跟朋友去一个有名的威尔士音乐酒吧ClWB INFO BACH，因为她同事玩band，那天晚上在这个酒吧演出，我们去捧场。门票比较有意思，付钱之后在手背上盖个章，长方形的灰黑色的框，框里印着这个酒吧的名字。Cool！可我当时却忽然联想到在市场买猪肉时看到的印在肉皮上的那个蓝圈圈。酒吧场子不大，旧木旧陈设，但气氛很好，离开之前已经有三个band在那里轮流上阵了。朋友的同事司吉他手，衬衫仔裤，人腼腆而温和，刚刚读完生物博士在公共事务机构工作。据说人很专一，其大学三年一直因暗恋某女生而荒废光阴。对于在酒吧文化中长大的英国人，我几乎都不敢相信这个据说。

 

校园，青春，爱情，性，89学运背景，所有的诱人元素似乎都凑齐了，再加上是禁片，再加上之前听闻一句‘这个片子如果公映，色戒的性爱镜头根本不算什么’，娄烨的‘颐和园’‘看上去很美’。

 

影片开头那段话很吸引人：“有一种东西，它会在某个夏天的夜晚象风一样突然袭来，让你措不及防，无法安宁，与你形影相随，挥之不去，我不知那是什么，只能称它为爱情。”很有杜拉斯的“情人”开篇的味道，带出一种氛围，一丝情绪。

 

确实，贯穿始终，伤感的情绪是导演一直想要hold住的一个基调。但我却伤感不起来。很失望，若不是饭后慵懒的心情很适合赖在沙发上，我可能要中途退场离席。我甚而有丝愤怒，觉得所有这些元素，这么好的演员，包括观影者的我们对青春、校园的怀旧心态都被娄烨绑架了，糟蹋了。

 

我感受到的是极端的不诚恳。我可以欣赏意识流的后现代处理手法，可以接受多到让人略微审美疲劳的人物或风景的定格画面，但我无法接受对校园场景的胡乱演绎，无法接受每次性爱场面定式般响起的配乐，无法接受拍摄多次性爱场面时明显的男性视角（可参考三级片的类型镜头），更无法接受居然将89这样重要的事件作为电影的噱头，特别是这样的一部“地下”电影。诚恳，这样一个基本的素质都不具备，go west看来是很毁人的。一部明显投机的电影，既算有些可圈可点之处，也实在让人无法对之产生好感。

 

好好学习，以备与洋人争辩的不时之需。

 

Protests in Tibet and Separatism: the Olympics and Beyond
Barry Sautman

Recent protests in Lhasa and other Tibetan areas were organized to embarrass the Chinese government ahead of the Olympics. The Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), the major Tibetan exile organization that advocates independence for Tibet and has endorsed using violent methods to achieve it, has said as much. Its head, Tsewang Rigzin, stated in a March 15 interview with the Chicago Tribune that since it is likely that Chinese authorities would suppress protests in Tibet, “With the spotlight on them with the Olympics, we want to test them. We want them to show their true colors. That’s why we’re pushing this.” At the June, 2007 Conference for an Independent Tibet organized in India by “Friends of Tibet,” speakers pointed out that the Olympics present a unique opportunity for protests in Tibet. In January, 2008, exiles in India launched a “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” to “act in the spirit” of the violent 1959 uprising against Chinese government authority and focus on the Olympics.

Several groups of Tibetans were likely involved in the protests in Lhasa, including in the burning and looting of non-Tibetan businesses and attacks against Han and Hui (Muslim Chinese) migrants to Tibet. The large monasteries have long been centers of separatism, a stance cultivated by the TYC and other exile entities, many of which are financed by the US State Department or the US Congress’ National Endowment for Democracy. Monks are self-selected to be especially devoted to the Dalai Lama. However much he may characterize his own position as seeking only greater autonomy for Tibet, monks know he is unwilling to declare that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, an act China demands of him as a precondition to formal negotiations. Because the exile regime eschews a separation of politics and religion, many monks deem adherence to the Dalai Lama’s stance of non-recognition of the Chinese government’s legitimacy in Tibet to be a religious obligation.

Reports on the violence have underscored that Tibetan merchants competing with Han and Hui are especially antagonistic to the presence of non-Tibetans. Alongside monks, Tibetan merchants were the mainstay of protests in Lhasa in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This time around, many Han and Hui-owned shops were torched. Many of those involved in arson, looting, and ethnic-based beatings are also likely to have been unemployed young men. Towns have experienced much rural-to-urban migration of Tibetans with few skills needed for urban employment. Videos from Lhasa showed the vast majority of rioters were males in their teens or twenties.

The recent actions in Tibetan areas differ from the broad-based demonstrations of “people power” movements in several parts of the world in the last few decades. They hardly show the overwhelming Tibetan anti-Chinese consensus portrayed in the international media. The highest media estimate of Tibetans who participated in protests is 20,000 — by Steve Chao, the Beijing Bureau Chief of Canadian Television News, i.e. one of every 300 Tibetans. Compare that to the 1986 protests against the Marcos dictatorship by about three million — one out of every 19 Filipinos.

Tibetans have legitimate grievances about not being sufficiently helped to compete for jobs and in business with migrants to Tibet. There is also job discrimination by Han migrants in favor of family members and people from their native places. The gaps in education and living standards between Tibetans and Han are substantial and too slow in narrowing. The grievances have long existed, but protests and rioting took place this year because the Olympics make it opportune for separatists to advance their agenda. Indeed, there was a radical disconnect between Tibetan socio-economic grievances and the slogans raised in the protests, such as “Complete Independence for Tibet” and “May the exiles and Tibetans inside Tibet be reunited,” slogans that not coincidentally replicate those raised by pro-independence Tibetan exiles.

While separatists will not succeed in detaching Tibet from China by rioting, they believe that China will eventually collapse, like the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and they seek to establish their claim to rule before that happens. Alternatively, they think that the United States may intervene, as it has elsewhere, to foster the breakaway of regions in countries to which the US is antagonistic, e.g. Kosovo and southern Sudan. The Chinese government also fears such eventualities, however unlikely they are to come to pass. It accordingly acts to suppress separatism, an action that comports with its rights under international law.

Separatists know they can count on the automatic sympathy of Western politicians and media, who view China as a strategic economic and political competitor. Western elites have thus widely condemned China for suppressing riots that these elites would never allow to go unsuppressed in their own countries. They demand that China be restrained in its response; yet, during the Los Angeles uprising or riots of 1992 — which spread to a score of other major cities — President George H.W. Bush stated when he sent in thousands of soldiers, that “There can be no excuse for the murder, arson, theft or vandalism that have terrorized the people of Los Angeles . . . Let me assure you that I will use whatever force is necessary to restore order.” Neither Western politicians nor mainstream media attacked him on this score, while neither Western leaders nor the Dalai Lama have criticized those Tibetans who recently engaged in ethnic-based attacks and arson.

Western elites give the Chinese government no recognition for significant improvements in the lives of Tibetans as a result of subsidies from the China’s central government and provinces, improvements that the Dalai Lama has himself admitted. Western politicians and media also consistently credit the Dalai Lama’s charge that “cultural genocide” is underway in Tibet, even though the exiles and their supporters offer no credible evidence of the evisceration of Tibetan language use, religious practice or art. In fact, more than 90% of Tibetans speak Tibetan as their mother tongue. Tibet has about 150,000 monks and nuns, the highest concentration of full-time “clergy” in the Buddhist world. Western scholars of Tibetan literature and art forms have attested that it is flourishing.

Ethnic contradictions in Tibet arise from the demography, economy and politics of the Tibetan areas. Separatists and their supporters claim that Han Chinese have been “flooding” into Tibet, “swamping” Tibetans demographically. In fact, between the national censuses of 1990 and 2000 (which count everyone who has lived in an area for six months or more), the percentage of Tibetans in the Tibetan areas as a whole increased somewhat and Han were about one-fifth of the population. A preliminary analysis of the 2005 mini-census shows that from 2000-2005 there was a small increase in the proportion of Han in the central-western parts of Tibet (the Tibet Autonomous Region or TAR) and little change in eastern Tibet. Pro-independence forces want the Tibetan areas cleansed of Han (as happened in 1912 and 1949); the Dalai Lama has said he will accept a three-to-one Tibetan to non-Tibet population ratio, but he consistently misrepresents the present situation as one of a Han majority. Given his status as not merely the top Tibetan Buddhist religious leader, but as an emanation of Buddha, most Tibetans credit whatever he says on this or other topics.

The Tibetan countryside, where three-fourths of the population lives, has very few non-Tibetans. The vast majority of Han migrants to Tibetan towns are poor or near-poor. They are not personally subsidized by the state; although like urban Tibetans, they are indirectly subsidized by infrastructure development that favors the towns. Some 85% of Han who migrate to Tibet to establish businesses fail; they generally leave within two to three years. Those who survive economically offer competition to local Tibetan business people, but a comprehensive study in Lhasa has shown that non-Tibetans have pioneered small and medium enterprise sectors that some Tibetans have later entered and made use of their local knowledge to prosper.

Tibetans are not simply an underclass; there is a substantial Tibetan middle class, based in government service, tourism, commerce, and small-scale manufacturing/ transportation. There are also many unemployed or under-employed Tibetans, but almost no unemployed or underemployed Han because those who cannot find work leave. Many Han migrants have racist attitudes toward Tibetans, mostly notions that Tibetans are lazy, dirty, and obsessed
with religion. Many Tibetans reciprocate with representations of Han as rich, money-obsessed and conspiring to exploit Tibetans. Long-resident urban Tibetans absorb aspects of Han culture in much the same way that ethnic minorities do with ethnic majority cultures the world over. Tibetans are not however being forcibly “Sincized.” Most Tibetans speak little or no Chinese. They begin to learn it in the higher primary grades and, in many Tibetan areas, must study in it if they go on to secondary education. Chinese, however, is one of the two most important languages in the world and considerable advantages accrue to those who learn it, just as they do to non-native English speakers.

The Tibetan exiles argue that religious practice is sharply restricted in Tibetan areas. The Chinese government has the right under international law to regulate religious institutions to prevent them from being used as vehicles for separatism and the control of religion is in fact mostly a function of the state’s (overly-developed) concern about separatism and secondarily about how the hyper-development of religious institutions counteracts “development” among ethnic Tibetans. Certain state policies do infringe on freedom of religion; for example, the forbidding, in the TAR (Tibet Autonomous Region), of state employees and university students to participate in religious rites. The lesser degree of control over religion in the eastern Tibetan areas beyond the TAR– at least before the events of March, 2008 — indicate however that the Chinese government calibrates its control according to the perceived degree of separatist sentiment in the monasteries.

The Dalai Lama’s regime was of course itself a theocracy that closely regulated the monasteries, including the politics, hierarchy and number of monks. The exile authorities today circumscribe by fiat those religious practices they oppose, such as the propitiation of a “deity” known as Dorje Shugden. The cult of the Dalai Lama, which is even stronger among monks than it is among Hollywood stars, nevertheless mandates acceptance of his claim that restrictions on religious management and practice in Tibet arise solely from the Chinese state’s supposed anti-religious animus. Similarly, the cult requires the conviction that the Dalai Lama is a pacifist, even though he has explicitly or implicitly endorsed all wars waged by the US.

The Dalai Lama is a Tibetan ethnic nationalist whose worldview is — in US terms — both liberal and conservative. He and many of his foreign supporters have a pronounced affinity for conservative politicians, such as Bush, Thatcher, Lee Teng-hui and Ishihara Shintaro, but they can get along well with liberals like US Speaker Nancy Pelosi, because they are virulently anti-communist and anti-China.

The Dalai Lama is far from being a supporter of oppressed peoples. For example, in 2002, when he visited Australia, the Dalai Lama, upon arriving in Melbourne, noted “he had flown over ‘a large empty area’ of Australia that could house millions of people from other densely populated continents.” The area is, of course, not wholly empty, as it contains Aborigines. To them, the Dalai Lama proffered the advice that “black people ‘should appreciate what white people have brought to this country, its development.’” (R. Callick, “Dalai Lama Treads Fine Line,” Australian Financial Review, May 22, 2002).

The development of the “market economy” has had much the same effect in Tibetan areas as in the rest of China, i.e. increased exploitation, exacerbated income and wealth differentials, and rampant corruption. The degree to which this involves an “ethnic division of labor” that
disadvantages Tibetans is however exaggerated by separatists in order to foster ethnic antagonism. For example, Tibet is not the poorest area of China, as is often claimed. It is better off than several other ethnic minority areas and even than some Han areas, in large measure due to heavy government subsidies. Rural Tibetans as well receive more state subsidies than other minorities. The exile leaders employ hyperbole not only in terms of the degree of empirical difference, but also concerning the more fundamental ethnic relationship in Tibet: in contrast to, say, Israel/Palestine, Tibetans have the same rights as Han, they enjoy certain preferential economic and social policies, and about half the top party leaders in the TAR have been ethnic Tibetans.

Tibet has none of the indicia of a colony or occupied territory and thus has no relationship to self-determination, a concept that in recent decades has often been misused, especially by the US, to foster the breakup of states and consequent emiseration of their populations. A settlement between the Chinese government and Tibetan exile elites is a pre-condition for the mitigation of Tibetan grievances because absent a settlement, ethnic politics will continue to subsume every issue in Tibet, as it does for example, in Taiwan and Kosovo, where ethnic binaries are constructed by “ethnic political entrepreneurs,” who seek to outbid each other for support.

The protests in Tibet had no progressive aspect. Many who participated in the ethnic murders, beatings and arsons in Lhasa were poor rural migrants to the city, but the slogans there and elsewhere in Tibet almost all concerned independence or the Dalai Lama. There have been many movements the world over in which marginalized people have taken a reactionary and often racist road, for example, al-Qaeda or much of the base of the Nazis. The riots in Tibet also have done nothing to advance discussions of a political settlement between the Chinese government and exiles, yet a settlement is necessary for the substantial mitigation of Tibetan grievances. For Tibetan pro-independence forces, a setback to such efforts may have been their very purpose in fostering the riots. Tibetan pro-independence forces, like separatists everywhere, seek to counter any view of the world that is not ethnic-based and to thwart all efforts to resolve ethnic contradictions, in order to boost the mobilization needed to sustain their ethnic nationalist projects. They have claimed that China will soon collapse and the US will thereafter increase its patronage of Tibetan state elite, to the benefit of ordinary Tibetans. One only has to look round the world at the many humanitarian catastrophes that have resulted from such thinking to project what consequences are likely to follow for ordinary Tibetans if the separatist fantasy were fulfilled

憋气，

 

又懒得写，

 

充满了无力感。

 

但，我的眼在看，

 

     我的耳在听，

 

     我的脑在思，

 

     我的心在记。

 

又及：从闲处得知drunk piano重新说话了，甚喜。一来又有了个消遣的去处，二来我懒她必不懒。一看，果然，洋洋洒洒，条分款析，言之有物，甚合吾心。

这么能掰的人都要分个1、2、3、4才好说话，又证问题的复杂性。这么复杂的问题要跟洗了一辈子脑的老外（不要以为只有独裁政权下才会被洗）用他能听懂的语言给他解释清楚，不是不可能，但常纳闷：有必要费那劲吗？

 

有朋友指出可能也怪不得别人乱报乱写，因为你消息封锁。遇到消息封锁新闻媒体就有编造的权利吗？估计他们的职业道德课上不会这样讲。而且，drunk piano说的好，“别跟我说是因为中共封锁信息所以很多西媒才误传信息，由于手机、网络、录像、旅行者口述和有限的现场记者，西媒已经掌握大量中立来源的信息，但是刻意误导还是无处不在。”

 

 

 

 

朋友要看陈年婚纱秀，正好拿出来晒晒。

 

 

gouf，苏格兰的方言，其意为“击、打”，高尔夫球的名称golf便来自于此。据说高尔夫球起源于苏格兰民间，形成于14、15世纪。

 

一朋友最近很发烧，大有将身边人都培养成爱好者的架势。于是昨天，在此君的撺掇下，一群人杀往球场。当中，只有我是初体验者。

 

上场一试身手，才晓得小白球是可爱滴，也是不容易击中滴。好胜心顿起。

 

终于，在十多二十个球之后，我手起杆落，击出高高的抛物线，“塔”的一声清脆之后，看着小白球直直飞向远远的绿荫，心情是无比舒畅滴。

 

以往看电视，见到高球赛事就转台。今后，会观摩一下先啦。

 

随便说一句：高尔夫在这里显然并不是什么奢侈运动，恰恰相反，比什么溜冰，游泳都便宜。2.75镑（对于这里的人来说就相当于国内的两块七毛五），70个球，不限时不限人，租秆子免费。唯一奢侈的应该是时间吧。

昨天上电影院看了一部不错的片子: The Bank Job，，演绎1971发生在伦敦东区的真实事件。我一边看一边心里暗惊：最近香港闹得最沸腾的‘破事儿’简直就是它的翻版，只是换堆人换个地方。很----黑----很-----讽----刺!

 

导火线都是“偷”，由偷银行里的个人保险柜变成偷笔记里的存储信息。只是偷银行的人最后得了正果，而Kira目前还下落未知，也许永远未知。这样是否意味着演绎的空间更大？

 

我期待不久的将来有部猛片，名字叫：The Laptop Job。

 又一次座无虚席，很久不见这样的场面，有点惊。听得很满足，内容，技巧，仪态无可挑剔，希望以后自己也能做这样优雅的老太太。

 

Title：The Politics of Place in a Globalised World

 

keywords：place, politics, globalisation, resposibility, identity

(上一个来讲globalisation的大牛是Saskia Sassen，也是个老太太，也是自有一种优雅的神态。忽然想到那个更著名的老太太Jacobs。智慧的魅力，老又何妨？）

 

Speaker：Professor Doreen Massey, Professor of Geography, Open University

           (More about her: http://www.open.ac.uk/socialsciences/staff/people-profile.php?staff_id=981933)

 

Some words: 'A place in the distance is actually implicating the place here.' (顿时联想到汉文语境中的‘彼岸’与‘此岸’，，走神3秒钟）

 

                  'Studying history is not for what we've done, but for what we are.' (my favorite)

 

                  'Construction of responsibility (in the process of globalisation) means construction of identity'

 

                  ',,,not thinking about the identity of belonging, but the identity of responsibility.'

 

很困，就这样，没有details，good night!

MSN搞怪，这两天都不能发东西，郁闷。于是错过了那个日子，大大前天。传说那天偶早上起来在板凳上捡到一只猴子，心情很好。

 

 

 

 

 

 

贪看湖上清风──侧写《色，戒》　

龙应台

 

我在德国的雪夜里翻读当年审讯丁默村的笔录等，后来再看《陈立夫回忆录》，发现这个立功的降将保释后游览玄武湖被一小报记者看到，写了出来，蒋介石看到，就很生气地下令枪毙。判他死刑的，不是真正的法院，也不是真正的法。

电影的瞬间大众魅力真的不是文学的慢火细炖可以比的。张爱玲的《色，戒》是一篇比较少人知道的短篇；如果不知史实背景，小说本身的隐晦粗描笔法更让一般的读者难以入门。李安的电影，却像一颗来势汹汹的大火球从天而落，边落还边星火四溅，嗤嗤作响，效果是，人人都在谈《色，戒》，凉凉的小说也被人手人嘴磨蹭得热了。
    
小说里的汉奸大坏蛋易先生，因为在小说里被处理得不够“坏”，当年《色，戒》发表时还被评论家批判，觉得张爱玲是非不明、忠奸不分。当时读了“域外人”对张爱玲的批评，我忍不住大笑。胡兰成不早就说过张爱玲的人格特质了吗？在“民国女子”里，他这么看二十三岁的她：“爱玲种种使我不习惯。她从来不悲天悯人，不同情谁，慈悲布施她全无，她的世界里是没有一个夸张的，亦没有一个委屈的。她非常自私，临事心狠手辣。”又说，“爱玲对好人好东西非常苛刻，而对小人与普通的东西，亦不过是这点严格，她这真是平等。”
    
而且，张爱玲文学作品里头最让人震撼、最深刻的部分，不正是她那极为特殊、极为罕见的“不悲天悯人”的酷眼。
    
如果张爱玲有一般人的“忠奸意识”，她大概也不会在二十三岁时，嫁给了赫赫有名的“汉奸文人”胡兰成啊。
    
易先生在小说里不够“坏”，除了张爱玲本身的认知价值和性格，除了她和胡兰成的极深刻、极缠绵的爱情之外，我看见一个很少被人提及的角度，那就是，小说和电影之外，民国史里头的“易先生”，其实也不见得是个多“坏”的“坏人”。
    
易先生的“原型”丁默村，一九零三年出生，因为陈立夫的举荐而做了调查统计局第三处的处长，第三处后来撤销，他就加入了汪精卫的政府，历任要职。中日战争结束前夕，他是“伪浙江省省长”。一九四七年七月五日，丁默村被枪毙，罪名是“通谋敌国，图谋反抗本国”，判决书里列出好多罪状，包括“主使戕害军统局地下工作人员及前江苏高二法院庭长郁华、与参加中统局工作之郑苹如……”
    
这样的一个“汉奸”履历，他的死刑不是理所当然吗？
    
不这么简单。
    
我在德国的雪夜里翻读南京市档案馆所保存成书的审讯汉奸笔录、判书、种种作为证据的信件、电报、便条等等，慢慢地看出一个故事的轮廓。尘封的史料所透露的真实人生如此曲折，几乎有血肉模糊之感，其幽微伤痛讽刺残酷完全不需要假借文学家之手。
    
在郑苹如因为刺杀丁默村未遂而被秘密枪决之后一年，一九四一年，时任国民政府教育部长的陈立夫和丁默村秘密取得了联系，对这位当年被他提拔过、如今为汪伪政权特务头子的后辈“晓以大义”，指示他应该设法“脱离伪区”，如果不能“脱离伪区”，就当“伺机立功，协力抗战”。陈立夫“策反”成功，往后的几年，丁默村表面上是傀儡政府的交通部长、福利部长，私底下，他为戴笠的军统局架设电台、供给情报，与周佛海合作企图暗杀当时的特务首脑之一李士群，并且配合戴笠的指示不断营救被捕的重庆地下工作人员。

这些被营救的情报人员，在审判庭上，也都具函作证，丁默村和重庆政府的合作是毫无疑义的。而在日本战败以后，局势混乱，重庆政府为了防止共产党趁机坐大以及新军阀崛起，又适时而有效地运用了丁默村这个棋子。他被国府任命为“浙江省军委员”，这一回，“浙江”前面没有“伪”字了。
    

我读到戴笠给“默村吾兄”的手书，戴氏要求丁默村在混乱危险中“切实掌握所部，维持地方治安，严防奸匪扰乱，使中央部队能安全接收”。而丁默村也确实一一执行了重庆的指令。在中央部队进入浙江之前，“奸匪”已经占有浙西半片，是在丁默村进行“剿匪”之后，中央部队才稳稳地接收了浙江。

夜半读史，我揉揉眼睛，困惑不已。

那么这丁默村等于是国民政府招降成功的一名降将，这名降将不曾回到“汉军”中来披麾上阵，但他留在“曹营”暗中接应，做苹果里的一条虫，等于是国民政府植在敌营的间谍，其处境何等危险，其功劳何等重要。在战争中，隐藏的间谍所发挥的作用绝对不小于沙场浴血的战士，不是吗？

当重庆政府需要丁默村的协助时，陈立夫和戴笠都曾对他提出保证。陈立夫应允丁可以“戴罪立功，应先有事实表现，然后代为转呈委座，予以自首或自新”。戴笠则说得更明确，“弟可负责呈请委座予以保障也”。

好啦，那么为什么国民政府在胜利后就杀对它有功的“降将”和“间谍”呢？尤其在早已给予不杀的具体保证之后？问题出在“委座”----蒋介石吗？

正在困惑时，陈立夫的回忆录出版了。于是飞电请求朋友“火速寄《陈立夫回忆录》来欧”。一周后书寄到，邮差从雪地里走来，胡子上还黏著白花花的细雪。我从他手中接过书，一把拆了包装，几乎就在那微微的飘雪中读了起来。

我竟然找到了答案。

 

《陈立夫回忆录》第二百三十二页：丁默村本来可以不死的，但有一天他生病，在狱中保出去看医生，从南京拘留所出来，顺便游览玄武湖……这个消息被蒋委员长看到以后，蒋委员长很生气的说：“生病怎还能游玄武湖呢？应予枪毙！”
 

丁默村就被枪毙了。只因为他从狱中出来，贪看一点湖上清风，被一小报记者认出来，写上了报。

 

 啊，我不禁掩卷叹息。难怪丁默村的死刑判决书读起来那么的强词夺理，对丁默村所提出来为自己生命作辩护的种种白纸黑字的有力证据完全漠视。原来，判他死刑的，根本不是一个真正的法院，也不是一部真正的法。

在那样的时代里，你对所谓“忠奸”难道不该留一点人性的空隙吗，不管是易先生还是丁先生，是张爱玲还是胡兰成？

 

 

 

2007年的最末一天出发去瑞士。

 

8天的行程，暴走逛老城，缓步细赏湖光山色，上山滑雪，下水泡温泉，间或寻些当地的精致点心店喝下午茶，，，，2008年的头数个日子似在云巅上，轻轻的飘着。

 

回来昏忙几日，今夜整理照片，看着，看着，耳边似回响起电影‘时光倒流70年’中的配乐，Somewhere in Time，，，

 

 

 

南方人看到雪，总有一种莫名的兴奋。所以，“山不在高，有雪则灵”，更莫说眼前延绵不绝的阿尔卑斯山脉。

 

 

脚踏Gonergrat, 远眺Klein Matterhorn；有人玩兴甚浓，有人画意大发。

 

话说上回在冷清的街上游荡，细心的看官想必注意到了‘next’的5:am-8:pm的告示。crazy? ，，是的，面对半价或低于半价的好货，老外也疯狂。中产阶层也好，纺锤性结构也罢，放眼望去，还是穷人多啊。。。。。

 

 

我辈穷学生，此时不购，更待何时？27日，为了更丰富的，折扣更大的货源，一群人驱车北上，舍Cardiff就Birmingham。

 

忙了一天，此时总算可以坐下来歇歇脚，喝口水。jimmy已经新货上身了，神态格外安详，emma则想着包包里的心水，窃喜，哈哈。

 

 

 

Typical British townscape......their cherished urban villages.